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Abstract
In this paper we aim at providing a theoretical framework to model
workers’ choice problem of switching between different pension schemes.
This choice problem is common in several countries that have reformed
their social security system in the last decades. Although with some
specific features, such process is currently affecting private sector em-
ployees in Italy, since the reform of the TFR mechanism in 2007. This
reform basically allows workers to choose between a scheme directly
managed by the firms and an external defined contribution scheme. In
their decision workers not only have to weight out the different pros
and cons that different schemes offer but they also have to consider
the effect that their choice exerts on the financial structure of the firm
they work in. Once we have formalized this decision problem, we carry
out some simulations in order to replicate the Italian data and to shed
some light on the outcomes of the Italian reform.
1 Introduction
In the last twenty years changes in the demographic structure and in the
growth expectations have induced many countries to reform their Social Se-
curity System (SSS). One of the most common features of these reforms
is the shift from a defined benefit scheme (DB) to a defined contribution
scheme (DC). According to the DB scheme, pensions mostly depend on
past wages, length of services and possibly on the expected length of the
retirement period, whereas according to the DC scheme, they depend on
the contributions paid, on the performance of pension funds (PF) where
contributions are invested and on the length of the retirement period. Some
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countries have also introduced notional contribution scheme (NDC) where
the pensions are financed through a PAYG scheme and are computed out
of contributions paid which are revalued at a given rate not depending on
the performance of funds but on some macroeconomic variables. While DB
schemes are still common, new reforms introduced DC or NDC in several
OECD countries: in particular Australia, Hungary, Mexico and Slovak Re-
public have switched to some form of DC scheme, while Italy, Poland and
Sweden introduced NDC schemes. Similar reforms were also implemented
in South America, with DC schemes replacing DB schemes: Chile was the
first one in 1981 and 10 more countries followed in the late nineties. De-
pending on the country, these switches to the new schemes were partial or
complete, voluntary or mandatory (for further details see Whiteford and
Whitehouse 2006 for OECD countries and Mesa-Lago 2006 for Latin Amer-
ica). To all extents, many workers in these countries had the possibility to
opt for complementary social security (CSS) investing thus in a PF, either
as a substitute or complement of the publicly granted pension.
1.1 The Italian experience
The situation in Italy is not an exception: here the SSS will hardly be
able to grant adequate pension benefits to the current generations of young
workers, in particular temporary workers, and after the 1990’s reforms that
transformed the PAYG Italian SSS from a DB to a NDC scheme, the replace-
ment rate between pension and last wage of private sector employees will
decrease from current 70-80% to less favourable levels ranging between 55%
and 79%, depending on both the working career length and the retirement
age (see Table A.1, Appendix A). In order to cope with this issue, since the
first reform of SSS in 1993 several laws have been introduced to strengthen
the CSS1 which, however, has remained undersized, both in absolute terms
and compared to the rest of developed countries (3.5% of GDP in 2006, see
Table A.2 in Appendix A).
Given the relatively poor results of previous attempts, a reform was con-
ceived in 2004 and implemented in 2007 in order to boost CSS for private
sector employees. Such reform affected the pre-existing termination indem-
nity payments (TFR) scheme, according to which a part of workers’ wage
is withheld by the employer and given back, revaluated at a certain rate,
upon retirement or, in any case, upon job termination; in many respects the
TFR resembles a mandatory DB scheme, with contributions withheld and
managed directly by the employer. The 2007 reform revised the mandatory
nature of this scheme and allowed workers to invest the contributions to
the TFR in the second pillar system through the principle of silent or im-
1For example, D.lgs. 124/93, l. 335/95, D.M. 703/96, D.P.C.M. 20/12/1999 (modified
by D.P.C.M. 26/02/2001), D.lgs. 47/2000, legge delega 243/2004, il D.lgs. 252/2005 e law
296/2006.
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plied consent and the provision of substantial fiscal incentives. The switch
from TFR to CSS is irreversible, while the choice of remaining at the TFR
scheme can be reconsidered in any future period (see section 4.1 for a deeper
description of the 2007 reform).
However, two years after the introduction of this reform, the observed ad-
hesion rates to CSS remain astonishingly low (only 26% of potential private
sector subscribers by the end of 2008 according to official data). Certainly
these low figures may be due to transitory effects, given the recent nega-
tive performances of financial markets and to the lack of information among
employees; however there might be also a permanent component at work,
whose evidence is given by another stylized fact of the adhesion pattern in
Italy, i.e. adhesion rates are positively correlated with firms’ size. If we
consider that about 54% of the Italian labour force is employed in firms
with less than 50 workers, the persistence of this stylized fact would imply
that a great part of the labour force will not switch to the newly introduced
scheme, thus casting doubts on the long run effectiveness of the reform.
The 2007 Italian reform has been analyzed by some authors, though a
full assessment is still to be done2. This literature, although effective in
highlighting some aspects of the problem, has not provided a general model
capable of rationalizing at the same time the aggregate outcomes of the
reform and the clear relation between firm size and adhesion rates to PF.
1.2 The theoretical framework and related literature
In this paper we start from this empirical evidence and we try to give a possi-
ble explanation by modeling explicitly the decision process behind workers’
choice, bringing to light the determinants of the choice to opt for a new
pension scheme3. Indeed the problem is only in part a classical case of
choice under uncertainty, but it is further complicated by two aspects that
are peculiar to the situation at hand: (a) the choice to switch from TFR
to PF is an irreversible one and (b) the decision has potentially relevant
consequences also for the firms. As to (b) we notice that the availability of
2In particular, on the workers’ side, Cozzolino and Di Nicola (2006) report data on
the intentions of workers about the reform and show that a large share of workers were
not willing to switch and not perfectly informed. Cesari et al. (2007) try to quantify
the economic incentives provided by the reform to adhere to CSS and place emphasis not
only on the fiscal rebates, but also on the presence of the “employer contribution”. On
the firms’ size, Bardazzi and Pazienza (2005) carry out simulations aiming at estimating
the cost of the reform for Italian firms and Calcagno et al. (2007) argue that the reform
will reduce the aggregate investment by medium-small enterprises, since it will reduce the
access to credit for some of them, and particularly for smaller firms (a view confirmed also
in Pazienza (1997) and Guiso (2003)).
3The literature on this point is rather thin, though much effort has been devoted to the
anaysis of the characteristics of the different pension schemes; for an overview of the latter
subject see Barr (2006) and Barr and Diamond (2006). A more analytical treatment can
be found in Blake (2006 and 2006a).
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the TFR stock might have both negative and positive effects on firms: on
one side it generates a sort of firing cost similar to a severance payment (in
fact a fired worker takes away from the firm the amount he has invested)4,
but on the other, it also supplies a source of credit and liquidity should the
need arise. Hence, the decision of workers is a complex one, as they realize
that their (irreversible) choice of adhering to an external PF affects their
future career also through the cost/benefit they induce on the firms they
are currently (and will be) employed in.
As to point (a) above, the literature is still embryonic, with some partial
exceptions. Bulow (1982) discusses workers’ and firms’ incentives for the
creation of a corporate pension plan and tries to assess whether this can
be seen as a form of implicit contract; Rauh (2006) analyzes the effect of
a corporate PF on the internal financial resources and on the core business
investments; Rauh (2009) focuses on how a corporate PF might influence
the financial investment strategy of firms. However these articles are not
interested in and do not introduce the choice problem of workers nor the
role of their investment inside the firm as a source of credit and liquidity,
something that is central in our paper.
More in detail, we model the decision problem that workers face, having
to choose, once and for all, between a safe (the TFR) and a risky (the PF)
asset. The key point of our work is that, upon taking this decision, the agent
will trade off not only the advantages and disadvantages of higher but riskier
returns provided by CSS relative to TFR, but also the “external effects” of
his decision on the financial health of the firm in which he is employed in.
Indeed, in our model firms can, in case of need, finance themselves through
three different channels: (1) the TFR stock (if any) available inside the firm
(2) the share (or the very entrepreneurs’) capital and, finally, (3) the credit
market. Given that we assume some imperfections in the capital market
and frictions in the labour market, the choice of an individual to switch
from TFR to CSS induces a damage to the financial solidity of the firm
and thus, a higher risk of unemployment. Moreover, such an external effect
(which we can interpret as a lack of coordination among workers) will turn
out to be higher the lower the number of workers employed by the firm and,
hence, will be almost negligible for workers employed in large firms: the
dimension of firms plays a crucial role in the worker decision.
The work is organized as follows: first we lay out the baseline theoretical
framework in order to determine the economic incentives according to which
individuals decide whether to adhere or not to CSS. Next, after sketching
the institutional setting of the Italian CSS system and the 2007 reform, we
complicate the analysis and simulate the above model to replicate the main
4This aspect has been investigated in Garibaldi and Pacelli (2008) where the emergence
of firing costs due to the TFR is confirmed: the authors also argue that the 2007 reform
will increase the probability of job termination for workers adhering to CSS. Moreover,
their data show that this outcome is less likely the larger the firm is.
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features of the Italian experience as well as to provide some insights on its
future outcomes.
2 Basic model
The aim of this section is to build a general model to formalize workers’
choice between different pension schemes with possibly different returns:
(i) a safe return scheme of contributions inside the firm (called TFR or T
henceforth) or (ii) a DC scheme of contributions external to it (called PF
or F henceforth). The key point is that we explicitly take into account the
effects that the choice of either of them may have on the financial structure
of the firm with consequences on workers’ labour career5.
2.1 The framework
We imagine an economy populated by identical agents and firms. All firms
employ the same number of workers, N , (N wiil be taken as a measure of
the size of the firm) and use the same technology for the production of a
commodity Y (the numeraire) in a regime of perfect long run competition.
To do that, they hire workers and pay them a gross wage w. Furthermore
the pay out dividends to the owners of the capital stock available within the
firm. Their production activity is subject to exogenous random shocks.
Agents can be in either of two possible states: they can be employed
in one of the above firms in which case they receive the wage w or they
are unemployed, in which case they receive a unemployment subsidy that is
expressed as a fraction b of the gross wage w. In either case they are bound
to invest an amount γ ·w < b ·w into a contribution scheme that is either a
safe return scheme directly managed by the firm (T ) or a F scheme external
to the firm.6 The amount contributed is the same, but returns are different:
a sure return r in the case of T and an uncertain return ρ in the case of F .
In the rest we shall assume that ρ¯ = Eρ > r. In either state, what is not
invested in a contribution scheme is immediately consumed.
2.2 Firms’ characteristics and endogenous separation
Each firm employs capital K and N workers and hence the total wage bill
for it is N ·w. Each worker enrolled in the T scheme keeps (and has kept) the
contribution γ·w inside the firm; if we denote by κ the number of periods that
5As anticipated in the Introduction, this model was conceived to fit the Italian case,
but it can be easily generalized to describe different cases.
6The hypothesis that an agent continues to pay the contribution also when unemployed
is not essential to the theoretical part; it is made only for simplicity purposes and can be
justified imagining that the agents keep contributing even in the state of unemployment;
clearly, in the case of TFR, this tantamounts to say that the contribution is invested into
a safe asset yielding the same returns as the TFR scheme.
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this type of worker were employed in the firm, we have that the actualized
stock of his contributions, managed within the firm, is κ·γ·w· (1+r)
t−1
r
or more
simply k ·γ ·w, where k = κ · (1+r)
t−1
r
. If we denote by s the share of workers
enrolled in the F scheme (supposedly identical in all firms) we have that the
total stock of contributions available within the firm is (1− s) ·N · k · γ ·w.
Finally, the amount of capital is expressed as a proportion of the total wage
bill, i.e. K = h ·N · w.
The structure of profits Given the above characteristics, firms’ total
costs are given by two components: the total wage bill N ·w and the remu-
neration of the capital stock: if we define ι as the rate at which capital is
remunerated, the latter component amounts to h ·N ·w · ι. In fact also the
amount (1 − s) · N · k · γ · w should be taken into account since its remu-
neration at the rate r is a cost for the firm but, for simplicity purposes and
without loss of generality, we assume that this stock is invested by the firm,
yielding the same remuneration as the T rate, so that the cost for the firm
is actually null7. Under these assumptions, firm’s profits are given by the
following expression:
Π = Y −N · w · (1 + h · ι) (1)
where Y is total production. If we define π = Π
N
as the profit per unit of
labour and y = Y
N
as the average product of labour, equation (1) can be
rewritten as
π = y − w · (1 + h · ι) . (1a)
External shocks on productivity We assume that the productivity of
a firm y is a stochastic variable8 drawn from a distribution with mean
w · (1 + h · ι), i.e. we assume that expected profits are zero, and with a
cumulative distribution function Ψ(y). Therefore with a probability of 12
production activity will result in a loss; however we assume that losses can
be borne by a firm first by not paying out dividends and then resorting to
the credit market where it will receive credit within the limits of the collat-
erals that it can provide to the banks: we assume that the collaterals are
the assets available within the firm, i.e. N · w · (h+ (1− s) · k · γ). Under
these assumptions a firm goes bankrupt if only if
π < −w · [γ · k · (1− s) · (1 + r) + h · (1 + ι)] (2)
7We justify the presence of different interest rates with the assumption of imperfections
in the capital markets.
8We are assuming that productivity is firm-specific but not worker-specific or, at any
rate, that it is not possible to observe the exact productivity of a given worker and fire
him if his productivity is below the wage.
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and, in view of equation (1a),
y < w · [1− γ · k · (1− s) · (1 + r)− h] . (2a)
Whenever productivity is below this threshold a firm goes bankrupt and
all its workers lose their job. Therefore the probability λ of losing a job is
nothing but:
λ = Ψ(w · [1− γ · k · (1− s) · (1 + r)− h]) . (3)
Since s is assumed equal for all firms, we have that the probability of being
fired is the same for all workers, whichever the firm they are employed in.
For the sake of notation, we denote as
λ˜ = Ψ
(
w ·
[
1− γ · k ·
(
1− s−
1
N
)
· (1 + r)− h
])
(3a)
the probability of failure of a firm in which one more worker has switched
from T to the F scheme. Accordingly the quantity φ = λ˜−λ is the increase
in the probability of failure of a firm induced by one more worker switching
to the F scheme, i.e. it is the extra damage produced by last switch to F .
In the Appendix B we shall prove
Proposition 1 Provided k > 0 we have
1. ∂λ
∂s
≥ 0: the probability of bankruptcy of a firm increases with the share
of workers enrolled in the F scheme.
2. ∂φ
∂N
< 0: the extra-damage of one more switch to the F scheme is lower
the greater the size of the firm.
3. limN→∞ φ = 0: the extra-damage of one more switch to the F scheme
is null in firms of very large size.
4. Provided the density of the shocks is not increasing to the left of the
mean
∂φ
∂s
≤ 0: the extra-damage of one more switch to the F scheme is lower
the higher the share of those already enrolled into F .
Point 1 in Proposition (1) is worth stressing, since it is crucial in what
follows: an increase in the number of workers switched to the F scheme
increases the probability of failure of their own firm and hence their own
probability of loosing the job. This is due to the fact the disappearance
of the T contributions as a consequence of the adhesion to the F scheme
weakens the financial structure of the firm and hence its capacity to resist to
negative external shocks; therefore the adhesion to a F scheme has private
advantages (higher returns) for the adherents but generates an damage to
the firm and, as a resort, a negative externalities to all the workers, either
passed to F or not, who find themselves in face of a higher risk of being
fired.
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2.3 Workers’ characteristics and utilities
Workers have identical preferences, infinite lives and discount the future at
an identical rate β. In our model workers have to decide in which scheme (T
or F ) to invest the mandatory pension contribution γ · w. Since we assume
that the adhesion to F is irreversible, we allow the possibility of switching
only for those workers that are currently enrolled in the T scheme (which
can be considered the ”default” status).
To examine the respective benefits of the two options we consider them
separately and let δ be the probability of an unemployed worker to be hired.
Permanence at the T In this case an employed worker receives the
amount (1− γ) · w for immediate consumption and the amount γ · w is
kept within the firm and given back to him at the end of career, revaluated
at a yearly risk-free rate r. We assume that instant utility is a positive
function of immediate consumption and of the end of career payments and
we denote it by u(w, r). Next, following a standard job search setup9, we
define VE(T ) as the present expected value of the lifetime utility of currently
being employed and enrolled in the T scheme; then the flow utility is given
by:
β · VE(T ) = u(w, r) + λ · [VU (T )− VE(T )] (4)
where VU (T ) is the present expected value of lifetime utility when unem-
ployed. Substantially this flow value of being employed is given by the flow
utility from consumption and the expected change in the asset expected
value (from employment to unemployment with probability λ).
In a similar way we can write the asset flow for an unemployed worker
enrolled into the T scheme as
β · VU (T ) = u(b, r) + δ · [VE(T )− VU (T )] (4a)
where u (b, r) is the instant utility from consumption in the unemployment
state (when worker receives the subsidy share b of wage). Combining (4)
and (4a) and rearranging we have
VE(T ) =
(β + δ) · u(w, r) + λ · u(b, r)
β · (β + λ+ δ)
. (5)
The switch to F The switch to F has two main consequences: first, the
contributions are revalued in each period t at the stochastic rate ρt drawn
from a normal distribution with a positive mean ρ¯ ( ρ¯ > r); second the
share of workers opting for F increases by 1/N , so that the probability for
the firm to go bankrupt rises and becomes λ˜. If we call Eu(w, ρ) the instant
expected utility of an employed (Eu(b, ρ) when unemployed) agent enrolled
9See Cahuc and Zylberg (2004), pages 109-113.
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in the F scheme we can obtain β ·VE(TF−→), the flow expected utility of being
employed for a worker who switched to the F scheme:
β · VE(TF−→) = Eu(w, ρ) + λ˜ ·
(
VU (TF−→)− VE(TF−→)
)
(6)
where VU (TF−→), is the expected utility of being unemployed, whose flow is
given by:
β · VU (TF−→) = Eu(b, ρ) + δ ·
(
VE(TF−→)− VU (TF−→)
)
. (6a)
The resulting expected value of being employed for a worker switching to F
is:
VE(TF−→) =
(β + δ) · Eu(w, ρ) + λ˜ · Eu(b, ρ)
β ·
(
β + λ˜+ δ
) . (7)
2.4 Individual incentives and endogenous choice
Consider a worker who is currently in the T scheme: his expected utility is
given by (5) and he knows that, if he opts for the F scheme he will obtain
(7). Then, a worker will switch from T to F if and only if VE(TF−→) > VE(T ),
that is:
(β + δ) · Eu(w, ρ) + λ˜ · Eu(b, ρ)
β ·
(
β + λ˜+ δ
) > (β + δ) · u(w, r) + λ · u(b, r)
β · (β + λ+ δ)
(8)
and, given the irreversibility of the choice, an equilibrium will be reached
when VE(TF−→) ≤ VE(T ): in such case no further workers will switch to F
and hence the share of adhesion s will be stable. We can rearrange the above
and obtain the incentive I ≡ VE(TF−→)− VE(T ):
I =
1
β · (q + λ)

q ·G− q · 1q + λ
φ
+ 1
· P + λ ·B

 . (9)
where q = β + δ, G = Eu(w, ρ) − u(w, r), P = Eu(w, ρ) − Eu(b, ρ) and
B = Eu(b, ρ)− u(b, r).
The incentive is made up of three parts: the first one represents the
financial gain of switching to F and is related to G; the second part is
the cost of switching and depends, among other things, on the loss during
unemployment P and on the ’extra damage’ φ; the third part is given by B,
i.e. the difference in utilities that the two schemes grant when unemployed.
The incentive function (9) is not easily tractable since it depends on the
sign and the magnitude of the terms G, P and B and no general properties
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can easily be found, apart the rather obvious fact that
∂I
∂G
=
q
β · (q + λ)
> 0,
i.e. the incentives to switch to the F scheme become greater the greater the
direct gains in utility from the adhesion to F are.
However in a particular, though plausible, case the following Proposition
can be stated, whose proof is relegated to the Appendix B:
Proposition 2 Suppose that G = Eu(w, ρ)−u(w, r) > 0 and B = Eu(b, ρ)−
u(b, r) > 0; then the following properties hold:
1. ∂I
∂N
> 0, i.e. the incentive increase as the size of firm grows.
2. lim
N→∞
I > 0, i.e. in sufficiently large firms, the incentive is always
positive.
Moreover if B ≥ G and the density of the shocks is not increasing to the
left of the mean, then
3. ∀N ∂I
∂s
≥ 0, i.e. the incentive increases with the share of workers
already switched to F .
The assumption that G and B are positive implies that the degree of
risk adversion is not high enough to offset the higher mean rate of return of
pension funds. The condition B ≥ G can be shown to be stisfied under the
assumption of low prudence.
As a Corollary to what remarked in Proposition 2.3, we have that the
value s∗ that nullifies incentives is unambiguously determined and is unique
whenever B ≥ G and the density of the shocks is not increasing to the left
of the mean since, under these conditions, the incentive is a monotonically
increasing function of s. However, apart from this situation, the form of
the incentive function depends crucially on the exact functional form of the
instant utility and of the cumulative density function of the productivity
shocks, so that, in general, there could exist more values of s abating the
incentive to switch to the F scheme.10
Finally, it is worth noticing that both h and k affect negatively the
probability of failure λ. However, their effect on the latter is ambiguous in
that, as we can see from equation (9), a change in λ affects in the same
direction both the ’financial gain’ and the ’cost of switching’, so that the
final effect on I depends on the exact specification of λ and u(.). Again, in
some specific cases, it is possible to state the following Proposition which is
proved in the Appendix B:
10Through this section we have somehow given for granted a relevant point, that is,
when analyzing the possible alternatives that a worker faces, we did not consider the
possibility that he simply postpones the switching to a future period. Indeed this third
possibility can be ruled out because it is always suboptimal as we prove in Appendix B.
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Proposition 3 Suppose that B ≥ G and the density of the shocks is not
increasing to the left of the mean, then the following properties hold:
1. ∂I
∂k
≥ 0, i.e. the incentives decrease as the number of yearly payments
held within the firm grows.
2. ∂I
∂h
≥ 0, i.e. the incentives decrease as the share of own capital over
wage increases.
2.5 A simple case: uniformly distributed shocks
We study now the case where productivity shocks are uniformly distributed:
for the sake of brevity we confine our discussion to the case in which G and
B are both positive and B ≥ G, which we believe to be the most interesting
case.
Suppose that Y
N
is drawn from a continuous uniform distribution that
ranges from 0 to twice the average costs AC (so that profits are, on average,
equal to zero), then Ψ (x) = x2·AC . In these circumstances equation (9) and
the properties described by Proposition 1, 2, 3 still hold and in addition we
have that:
λ =
1− γ · k · (1− s) · (1 + r)− h
2 · (1 + h · ι)
for 0 < 1− γ · k · (1− s) · (1 + r)− h < 2 · (1 + h · ι)
(10)
and that
φ =
γ · k · (1 + r)
2 · (1 + h · ι)
·
1
N
(10a)
where w was, without loss of generality, normalized to 1. The above equa-
tions tell us that s only influences λ and not φ. Note that when the condition
0 < 1 − γ · k · (1− s) · (1 + r) · w − h · w < 2 · w · (1 + h · ι) is not met, λ
is either one or zero: these latter cases are trivial and thus we omit their
analysis.
We can examine how the incentive depends on the share of adhesion
simply deriving equation (9) with respect to s:
∂I
∂s
=
1
β · (q + λ)
[
q · φ ·
P
(q + λ+ φ)2
+B − β · I
]
·
∂λ
∂s
. (11)
A few results follow from the above: first, for negative values of the incentive
the derivative is always positive; second, when the incentive is positive the
sign is undetermined and is defined by the sign of q ·φ · P
(β+λ+φ·)2
+B−β · I;
finally when N is large enough φ tends to zero and B − β · I < 0 and the
derivative is necessarily negative.
In figure 1 we represent two possible shapes of the incentive function: in
one the curve is always positive, in the other it crosses the horizontal line
between 0 and 1.
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Figure 1: Shapes of the incentive function
Note that the results stated above imply that 1) the incentive curve can-
not intersect the horizontal axis from above (in that
∂I
∂s
> 0 when I < 0 and
the I curve is continuous in the (0,1) interval) and that 2) the intersection,
s∗ if it does exist, is unique. However, s∗ cannot be a stable equilibrium and
is, rather, a threshold: when below that value no further adhesions occur
and s stays constant at its current level, when above that value all workers
find it convenient to switch and s eventually reaches one.
Summing up, under the hypothesis of uniformly distributed shocks and
without agents’ heterogeneity it is possible to identify a threshold value
of s which constitutes an unstable equilibrium. Above that value, and in
the absence of frictions, all workers switch to F , while below that value no
further worker does. It follows that the outcome in terms of participation
rates is binary, either the initial level of s or 1. In addition, the variation of
the conditions of the system affects the value of the threshold, determining
the likelihood of ending in one of the two possible outcomes; for example, a
higher size of firms decreases the values of the threshold and, hence, increases
the probability that all workers switch to the F .
3 The simulation strategy
The model examined in the previous Sections sheds some light on the be-
haviour of agents and the characteristics of the incentives they face when
contemplating the switch to the new F scheme (see Proposition 2). However
it is not completely satisfactory at least in three respects:
1. the incentive function crucially depends on the individual valuation of
the different states in which an agent can find himself after a choice,
i.e. incentives may differ depending on the specific form of the pref-
erences of the worker and his degree of risk aversion, i.e. the explicit
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consideration of heterogeneity in workers’ characteristics is called for.
2. the incentive function depends also on the specification of the failure
probability of the firms, and this latter, apart from the particular form
of the probability of the shocks to productivity, is heavily affected by
(a) the size of the firm itself (N);
(b) the financial structure of the firm (k and h)
whereas the theoretical analysis of Section 2 deals only with the sim-
plified case in which all firms are of the same size and have an identical
financial structure. In other words, the consideration of heterogeneity
in firms’ characteristics is called for.
3. workers’ incentives of course depend on the other workers’ decisions
through s, but, as shown in Proposition 2, a same value of s gives
different incentives in firms of different sizes and the system may be in
a resting point with different adhesion rates in firms of different sizes.
This fact may affect individual decisions through the expectations that
an agent, fired by a firm, has about the possibility to be hired in a firm
of different size. The theoretical part did not take into account this
effect since the analysis concentrated on firms of identical sizes, but
a more realistic framework should tackle this point; in other words, a
more explicit consideration of the interaction among workers’ decisions
and expectations is called for.
To deal with these aspects we set up a simulation framework to gain
some insights into the working of an economy stylized as in Section 2 with
the superimposition of explicit elements of heterogeneity and interaction
that would make a formal analysis intractable. To this purpose, we adopt a
standard Agent Based Model approach modelling agents as follows.
3.1 Workers
We have a population ℑ of workers, each of them described by the following
vector of characteristics:
Wi = {ai, βi, ji, αi, Hi} ∀i ∈ ℑ (12)
where
ai is a parameter defining individual preferences;
βi is the individual discount rate;
ji identifies the firm which i works in;
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αi is a parameter indicating the probability that an agent will actually
switch to F when he has positive incentive11;
Hi describes the information available to i and is made up by the knowledge
of the financial structure of the firm ji and the distribution of the
failure rates of firms across the economy.
3.1.1 Consumption levels and instant utilities
We assume worker’s preferences are represented by the following instant
CRRA utility function:
ui (c) =
cai
ai
(13)
where c is instant consumption and a is the risk aversion coefficient (a < 1
represents risk aversion, while a > 1 represents a risk prone attitude).
As described in Section 2, agents receive an income w when employed
and b · w when unemployed and in either state an amount γ · w is forcedly
invested in a pension plan (either T or F ); these latter payments cumulates
at a given rate and will be given back to him only at the end of the working
career. Since agents have infinite lives, we assume that they smooth this
wealth over the working life and approximate this pension with an annuity
pτ , τ ∈ {T, F}, whose future value at a risk free rate (assumed equal to ι) is
equal to the future value of periodical payments γ · w. Clearly pτ depends
on the rate of return of the investment scheme12 and will be a single value
in the case of T (where accumulation occurs at the certain rate r) while it
will be a random variable in the case of F (when accumulation occurs at
the stochastic rate ρ).
By this token, we have the following utility levels
T case, employment state: ui(w, r) = ui((1− γ) · w + pT )
T case, unemployment state: ui(b, r) = ui((b− γ) · ·w + pT )
F case, employment state: Eui(w, ρ) =
∫ +∞
−∞
ui((1−γ)·w+pF )·f (pF ) d pF
where f (pF ) is the distribution function of the random variable pF
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F case, unemployment state: Eui(b, ρ) =
∫ +∞
−∞
ui((b − γ) · w + pF ) ·
f (pF ) d pF .
11This parameter is not necessarily, and indeed will not be, 1; by this we mean that
there are some frictions in the process of switching and we can imagine that these are due
to misinformation, lack of financial literacy or a sort of aversion to changing: all these
aspects are measured by the parameter α. We imagine that the information is shared
among workers belonging to the same firms so that α will be the same for all workers of
a given firm.
12It depends also on other factors such as the fiscal regime, fiscal rebates, possible
additional contributions from firms and the age of retiring.
13Indeed this distribution function will be computed numerically as shown in the Ap-
pendix C.
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3.1.2 Expectations
We assume that every worker formulates expectations about the future prob-
abilities of being employed in his own original firm (ǫ), or being unemployed
(η) or being employed in another firm (θ). The expectation formation mech-
anism follows a simple adaptive scheme represented by a dynamic system
ǫi (t+ 1) = ǫi (t) · (1− λji) (14)
ηi (t+ 1) = ηi (t) · (1− δ) + λji · ǫt + Λi · θi (t) (14a)
θi (t+ 1) = θi (t) · (1− Λi) + δ · ηi (t) (14b)
where λ is the probability of bankruptcy of the firm which i is working in,
δ is the reabsorbing rate and Λ is the average probability of bankruptcy of
all other firms except ji, that is the one which agent i works in.
Imposing the obvious initial conditions ǫi (0) = 1, ηi (0) = 0 and θi (0) =
0, the above dynamical system has a solution
ǫi (t) = (1− λji)
t ∀t ≥ 0 (15)
ηi (t) =


0 for t = 0
λji for t = 1
((1−λji )
t−1)·(λji−Λi)·Λi+δ·((1−λji )
t·(λji−Λi)−λji ·(1−δ−Λi)
t+Λi)
(δ+Λi)·(δ−λji+Λi)
for t ≥ 2
(15a)
θi(t) =
{
0 for t < 2
−
δ·(−δ+λji−λji ·(1−δ−Λi)
t−Λi+(1−λji )
t·(δ+Λi))
(δ+Λi)·(δ−λji+Λi)
for t ≥ 2
(15b)
Clearly the expected probabilities of being employed or unemployed as a
result of a switch to the F scheme are the same as above simply replacing the
probability of default λji with λ˜ji and of default of other firms Λi with Λ˜i,
where the latter may differ from Λi because anyone knows that, switching
to F , he may contribute to the deterioration, with respect to the presently
observed situation, of the financial conditions of any firm in which he can
happen to enter.
3.1.3 Lifetime utilities
In any period an agent expects to be employed or unemployed with the
probabilities given above and hence, with same probabilities, he will receive
the corresponding payoff.
The T case In this case the instant expected utility of an agent i ∈ ℑ in
a generic period t is
Eui,t(T ) = (ǫi (t) + θi (t)) · ui(w, r) + ηi (t) · ui(b, r) (16)
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Summing up over t and discounting at the rate βi gets the lifetime utility of
remaining at the T scheme, i.e.
VE,i(T ) =
ui(b, r) · λji · (βi + Λi) + ui(w, r) ·
(
β2i + δ · λji + βi · (δ + Λi)
)
βi · (βi + λji) · (βi + δ + Λi)
(17)
which simplifies to (5) when we assume Λi = λji = λ ∀i ∈ ℑ.
Switching to F In this case the instant expected utility of an agent i ∈ ℑ
in a generic period t is
Eui,t(F ) = (ǫ˜i (t) + θ˜i (t)) · Eui(w, ρ) + η˜i (t) · Eui(b, ρ) (18)
Summing up over t and discounting at the rate βi gets the lifetime utility of
remaining at the T scheme, i.e.
VE,i(TF−→) =
ui(b, r) · λ˜ji · (βi + Λ˜i) + ui(w, r) ·
(
β2i + δ · λ˜ji + βi · (δ + Λ˜i)
)
βi · (βi + λ˜ji) · (βi + δ + Λ˜i)
(19)
which simplifies to (8) when we assume Λ˜i = λ˜ji = λ˜ ∀i ∈ ℑ.
3.2 Firms
We have a population J of firms of different sizes from 1 to N . They all
have the same technology and each of them is described by the following
vector of characteristics:
Aj = {hj ,kj , θj} ∀j ∈ J (20)
where
kj measures the per worker amount of contributions kept within the firm;
hj measures the amount of social capital within the firm expressed as a
percentage of the total wage bill;
θj is a dummy variable indicating whether the firm made an agreement with
workers to share the burden of an extra contribution to the pension
fund in the case they switch to F ;
3.3 Economy-wide parameters and state variables
There are some parameters that describe the structure of the economy and
some variables that are the result of individual actions and hence they may
change through time due to the evolution of the system. All of them are
common knowledge and, in particular, they can be briefly described as:
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r the certain capitalization rate of the funds contributed by agents enrolled
in the T scheme.
f(ρ) the probability distribution of the uncertain capitalization rate ρ of
the funds contributed by agents enrolled in the F scheme.
π the economy wide (assumed constant) inflation rate.
ι the certain return on private investments in capital. ι is also assumed to
be the risk free rate of interest.
(s1, . . . , sJ) the profile of the adhesion rates across firms. They in turn
determine the profile of failure probability of each firm (λ1, . . . , λJ).
τ a set of parameters describing the fiscal treatments of wages, contributions
and returns.
3.4 The mechanics of simulation
The simulation of the model works according to a simple mechanics. Ini-
tially each worker is generated drawing his specific parameters from a given
distribution and is then assigned to a firm whose parameters have been ran-
domly drawn as well. Then in any given period (t = 0, 1, 2, . . .) we compute
the value of the incentive function for every worker and according to that
value we determine whether he switches to F or not. However a worker with
positive incentive will actually switch only with the probability αi.
Once the actual number of switching workers has been determined, a
new period begins, in which a new s is determined in each firm according
to what happened in the previous period. The new value of s determines
a new default probability (possibly different from firm to firm) and these
new probabilities, due to the expectations formation mechanism, affects the
individual incentives for those workers that were still enrolled into the T
scheme within the firm. Workers with positive incentives and selected for
making the choice will switch to F thus changing the next period s within
the firm, while the simultaneous choices of workers within the other firms
will modify the adhesion rate elsewhere. This procedure goes on for several
periods until the incentives of all workers are non-positive or the adhesion
rate is 1: at that point an equilibrium is reached and the value of s becomes
stable. In order for the simulations to be statistically significant, we perform
the simulation with a large number of firms and workers14.
14Indeed we perform sinulations with 4 millions firms and roughly 12 millions workers
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4 The application to the italian case: an Assess-
ment of the Italian TFR reform
4.1 The institutional framework in Italy after the recent re-
forms
The Italian TFR is regulated by the article 2120 of the Civil law Code
(Codice civile) which states that each firm in the private sector has to put
aside, for each tenured worker 6.91% of gross salary per year. These con-
tributions are capitalized at 1.5% per year plus 75% of the inflation rate;
therefore the TFR fund so far has represented a cheap source of financing
for the firms. Employees have the possibility to partially withdraw from
such a fund, although under very specific conditions (for example, to pur-
chase a house or for medical expenditures). Upon his dismissal a worker has
the right to obtain the whole TFR stock and both interests and capital are
taxed at favourable rates15.
In order to promote supplementary pensions in 2007 a reform was intro-
duced for private sector employees, which entails the possibility of devolving
the TFR to the CSS. The adhesion to PF is irreversible and it may occur
through a mechanism of silent or implied consent. To make the switch from
TFR to CSS more attractive to workers, a particularly favourable fiscal
treatment for CSS has been conceived: in particular, the cumulated value
of the investment obtained upon dismissal is taxed at a rate that ranges
between 9-15% (depending on years of contributions) whereas in the case of
TFR it is taxed at the average of last 5 years tax rate on personal income
(usually around 23% but more for richer workers). Finally, the law explicitly
allows for the possibility of receiving extra “employer contribution” for the
workers switching to the CSS, provided that they add a voluntary contri-
bution (currently these contributions amount to 1.16% and 1.27% of gross
wage respectively) and that they opt for occupational PF. As far as firms
are concerned, to partially offset the potential damage to the financial solid-
ity of enterprises, the legislator has provided tax rebates for contributions
transferred to CSS. The reform also discriminates between firms of different
sizes; in fact workers employed in firms with more than 50 employees have
to transfer their TFR to a publicly managed fund if they decide not to sub-
scribe a PF. For this reason we focus our analysis only on firms with less
than 50 employees.
The principle of “freedom of choice” explicitly stated by the law, has been
safeguarded through the mechanism of silent or implied consent. However,
while the choice of switching to PF is irreversible, the option of maintaining
the contributions inside the firm can be reconsidered in any future period.
Several authors argue that this asymmetry of treatment, together with other
15The entire stock of the TFR is insured by law, therefore, workers receive back their
money even in the occurrence of the firms’ bankrupcy and can consider it a safe asset.
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critical aspects (such as the non-full portability of the “employer’s contri-
bution”), are mostly responsible for the partial failure of the reform.
As a matter of fact, the adhesion rates, after two years, are clearly unsat-
isfactory. As shown by Table 1(a), from 2006 to 2007 the rate of subscription
to CSS has increased from 16.28% to 25.11% and remained nearly stable in
2008.
Adherents to any kind of
pension funds
2008 3603000
2007 3402135
2006 2161455
Potential adherents to pension
funds
2008 13870000
2007 13548800
2006 13278100
Aggregate adhesion rates (%)
2008 25.98
2007 25.11
2006 16.28
(a) Adhesion to PF for private sector
employees (source: COVIP 2006, 2007
and 2008)
Adherents to pension funds
that contribute with their TFR
(excluding pre-1993 adherents)
2008 2403042
2007 2274285
2006 1163501
Potential adherents to pension
funds
(excluding pre-1993 adherents)
2008 13386000
2007 13106800
2006 12861100
Aggregate adhesion rates (%)
2008 17.95
2007 17.35
2006 9.05
(b) Adhesion to PF for private sector
employees contributing with their TFR
(our elaboration from COVIP data)
Table 1: Adhesion rates in italy
The situation is even worse if we consider that the above data refer to
workers that have adhered to any kind of PF. If we focus only on workers
that transferred their TFR to CSS and if we exclude those that had adhered
to a PF before 1993, we obtain lower figures (see table 1(b)). The latter
data are probably more suitable to describe the outcome of the 2007 reform
which, as stated above, aimed at favouring the switch from TFR to CSS;
hence we refer to these data in the rest of the paper. A second feature
which is worth mentioning is that the adhesion rates are increasing with
the size of the firm, as shown in the table below. In particular, table 2
shows how total adhesions are distributed among firms of different size and
reveals that the distribution of adhesions and employment are significantly
different. Consequently, adhesion rates vary greatly across size, with larger
firms having higher adhesion rates.
Distribution of Distribution of adhesions Total adhesion rate
employees (%) (%) (%)
Size of thefirm 2006 2006 2007 2008 2006 2007 2008
1-19 40 10.70 14.10 12.50 2.43 6.15 5.64
20-49 14 9.00 10.40 9.00 5.90 12.81 11.46
50 - 249 18 22.80 25.40 25.10 11.05 23.62 23.38
250 + 28 57.50 50.10 53.40 18.76 31.36 33.42
Total 100 100 100 100 9.05 17.35 17.95
Table 2: Adhesion rates by firm size
In the rest of the paper we will try to shed light on these features of the
outcomes of the 2007 reform.
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4.2 The setting of base parameters
In this section we simulate the above framework to assess the outcomes of
our model tailored to the Italian experience. In order to pursue this goal,
first we have to fix proper values for the basic parameters of the model and,
since it was not always possible to obtain exact measurements of them, we
adopted the following empirical strategy:
1. we use existing data when available;
2. we resort to proxies for all other variables;
3. we set the standard deviations of the parameters, when their value is
not available, to one third of their mean.
The idea behind the last point is to allow the parameters to show some
variance without producing economically unreasonble values16.
To perform the simulation we also have to specify some further details,
such as the tax regime and fiscal rebates, firms’ contribution and so on.
From these points of view the simulation replicates both the pre and post
reform scenarios in Italy. After replicating the pre and post reform periods,
we push the analysis forward and try to make some predictions on the future
adhesions to the Italian CSS.
Workers As far as workers are concerned, they are basically defined by the
degree of risk aversion and by the rate at which they discount the future; we
assume these parameters are drawn from normal distributions with means
and standard errors described in the table below.
Workers’ parameters
Mean Standard Deviation
Discount rate 0.02 0.0066
Risk aversion coefficient -2 1.5
Share of risk averse workers 95%
Table 3: Workers’ parameters
We set the average risk aversion coefficient equal to -2 because there
is a wide consensus in the literature that this can be a realistic value, for
instance Schlechter (2007); its variance was chosen to deliver a reasonable
share of risk averse population.
Firms The financial structure of the firms is basically determined by two
parameters: the amount of TFR payments that are kept within the firms
(k) and the ratio of own capital over total wage bill (h), both measuring how
16In particular, most parameters are economically significant only for positive values:
setting the standard deviation to one third, we confine the possibility of an unrealistic
value to the extreme tail of the distribution.
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much the firms can rely on these sources of credit before going bankrupt.
Data from k were taken from Ministry of Labour and Social Policies (2002)
and data for h were derived from Bardazzi and Pazienza (2005).
Each firm is also defined by the presence or absence of an agreement
with an occupational PF: the probability of this occurrence was proxied by
the ratio of potential adherents to occupational Pension Funds over total
private sector employees, so that it measures the probability that a worker
can effectively subscribe to an occupational pension fund which grant the
extra contribution from the employer. Finally the value of the parameter
representing the degree of information α (that we assume to be firm specific),
in the absence of exact data, was chosen according to some proxies taken
from two different surveys. More precisely, we set 1−α = 0.5 (i.e. α = 0.5)
in the pre-reform period, that is the percentage of workers interviewed in
2002 by Bank of Italy who declared either to be unable to predict their
future pension or not to be in the need of a supplementary pension. As for
the post reform, we could rely on a more precise proxy and we set α = 0.7
because the ISAE (2005) survey showed that, at the end of 2005, 71% of
workers were informed about the TFR reform and the possibility to switch
to F . The values of the parameters for the firms are summarized in the
table below.
Firms’ parameters
Mean Standard Deviation
Amount of TFR payments kept
within the firm
5.17 1.72
Capital share over total wage bill 0.339 0.113
Degree of information (pre-reform) 0.5 0.16
Degree of information (post-reform) 0.7 0.23
Agreement probability (pre-reform) 0.69
Agreement probability (post-
reform)
0.78
Ratio of Standard error to average
productivity
033
Table 4: Firms’ parameters
System parameters System parameters describe the economic system
and therefore are common across all firms and workers. These parameters
determine aspects of the labour market (the hiring rate and the replacement
rate), of the credit markets (interest rates on loans to firms and interest rates
on consumer credit), and of the working of the F scheme (the contribution
share over gross wage, the tax rate on contributions and on interests, the real
returns in the F and T schemes). The data for the unemployment benefits
are obtained as the average of the replacement wage that was fixed by the
law during the period we are examining. The values of expected return in
the F scheme are another key issue. For the simulation of the pre-reform
phase we used historical data and we adopted the average rate of return of
PF over the years 1999-2006, as given in Cesari et al. (2007). Things are
more complex for the post-reform period: first, long enough time series are
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not available and second, the 2008 financial crisis is likely to have induced
lower expectations on returns for F investments. Hence we decided to vary
the pre-reform expectations using as a proxy the reduction of the returns
on long terms government bonds (10 years BTP in our case) in the second
part of 2008, according to the data provided by Bank of Italy.
Moreover, the reforms introduced some benefits for those workers opting
for the F scheme, in the form of better fiscal conditions: in the simulation we
use those benefits to compute the annuities pT and pF as described in Ap-
pendix C. Finally, in our model average productivity is simply a numeraire
on which wages are based. Therefore values of productivity and wages are
simply chosen to be in scale with the rest of the variables. All values used
in the benchmark simulation are summarized in Table 5.
System parameters
Mean Standard Deviation
Contribution to TFR and PF as a share of wage 0.0691 -
Firm’s contribution to PF 0.0116 -
Worker’s voluntary contribution to PF 0.0127 -
Hiring rate 0.9 -
Risk free interest rate 0.05 -
Rate of return on invested capital 0.05 -
Pre-reform parameters
Nominal rate of return over PF contributions 0.045 0.02
Inflation rate (average 1996-2006) 0.0225 -
Tax rate on TFR contributions 0.23 -
Tax rate on PF contributions 0.23 -
Replacement rate from unemployment benefit 0.357 -
Post-reform parameters
Nominal rate of return over PF contributions 0.0427 0.02
Inflation rate (average 1998-2008) 0.0242 -
Tax rate on TFR contributions 0.23 -
Tax rate on PF contributions 0.09 -
Replacement rate from unemployment benefit 0.55 -
Table 5: System parameters
4.3 Simulation results
We present now the results of the simulations, starting from the benchmark
case performed according to the strategy presented above. Two features
of the results are worth mentioning. First, as it is clear from Figure 2,
the simulated participation rates neither stay at their starting level (0 at
the beginning of the pre-reform period) nor reach 1, but lie somewhere in
between. Second, the equilibrium value of s is significantly dependent on the
size of the firms, with bigger firms displaying higher values of the adhesion
rates.
Table 6 summarizes the results of the simulation and shows that they
are quite in line with the observed values of the adhesion rates, both for pre
and post reform periods.
Next, we present the results of the sensitivity analysis on the main pa-
rameters of the model. The reason for such analysis is twofold: on the one
hand, we want to check whether the results are robust to changes of the
parameters (i.e. small changes of the latter do not produce unrealistic out-
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Figure 2: Adhesion rates before and after the reform
Adhesion rates for class size (%)
Class Real value Simulated value Real value Simulated value
size 2006 2006 2008 2008
1-19 2.43 2.19 5.64 5.35
20-49 5.90 6.49 11.47 13.52
1-49 3.32 3.16 7.16 7.16
Table 6: Simulation results: adhesion rates
comes) and whether the simulated effects of such changes on the equilibrium
values of s display the expected signs. On the other hand we aim at sheding
some light on how adhesion rates react to different scenarios concerning the
economic environment or the incentives to adhere to PF.
To accomplish the first goal we compute the adhesion rates of the post-
reform period (years 2007-2008), for different values of the main parameters
of the model. The results, presented in Figure 3, show that almost all pa-
rameters have the expected effect on the adhesion rates and that the results
are rather stable. In particular, although with few exceptions, when the pa-
rameters are allowed to take the highest values explored in our simulations,
the adhesion rates almost double (or are halved in the case of variation of the
standard deviation of the productivity shock), while in the case of changes
of the share of firms’ own capital the participation to the PF scheme are
even higher. However, if we focus on the interval ±30% around the bench-
mark values of the parameters under investigation, we can see that results
are particularly sensitive to unemployment benefits, to the returns to PF
and to the volatility of the productivity shocks.
On the contrary, neither the hiring probability nor the volatility of the
PF return rates appear to play a significant role. As for the former, this
outcome may depend on the fact that the increase of the hiring probability
makes the individual better off in either states, i.e. T or F , moreover we
can add that according to our model, the gain from the higher reabsorbtion
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Figure 3: Sensitivity analysis for some key parameters
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probabilty is slightly more likely to occur in the F case, where the chance
of being unemployed is higher.
As for the volatility of PF return rate, the reason for the relatively low
sensitivity of the results stems from the fact that the contribution of the
“lottery” (i.e. the F returns) to the overall utility is rather small (according
to our parameters, the pension annuities amount to 5-7% of the gross wage),
such that higher losses or gains from the lottery do not affect significantly
the individual welfare. As a consequence, the decision to adhere to the F
scheme seems to be driven mostly by the expected value of the gain rather
than its volatility, on the one hand, and on the loss of welfare in case of
unemployment on the other hand.
As for the volatility of PF return rate, the reason for the relatively low
sensitivity of the results stems from the fact that the contribution of the
“lottery” (i.e. the PF returns) to the overall utility is not particularly large
(according to our parameters, the pension payments amount to 5-7% of
the gross wage) and is generally outweighted by the huge loss in case of
unemployemt.
Finally, the role of k, the average number of yearly contributions to
the TFR scheme set aside by the firms, is worth to be commented. As
shown by the Figure, its effect on the adhesion rates is not monotonic and,
more precisely, is U shaped. The reason is that, when k increases, two
opposite forces are at work. On the one hand, such an increase enhances the
robustness of the firm, given that TFR contributions are an internal cheap
source of cash flow; on the other hand, it amplifies the damage that worker’s
withdrawal of the TFR funds generates on the same financial solidity of the
firm. According to our simulations it turns out that the latter effect tends
to dominate the former for low levels of k, while it is offset for higher values
of k.
We conclude this section by investigating the steady state (or long run)
results of the reform; in particular, by exploring different scenarios con-
cerning the economic performances of the PF scheme and the speed of the
adhesion of workers (for example, due to enhanced information campaigns)
we aim at assessing whether the current worrying scarce results of the 2007
reform are temporary or permanent. For doing this we perform some sim-
ulations by assuming values for the inflation rate and PF nominal returns
(2.25% and 4.5% respectively, in line with the last decade values) and ex-
tend the simulation periods from 2 to 15 iterations, so that the reform has
enough time to display its full effects: Figures 4 and 5 show the results of
such an exercise.
As for the rate of return of the PF scheme, it can be seen that the
adhesion rate are indeed significatively sensitive to this parameter but only
when the latter is above 5% (that is only for extremely optimistic rate of
return), we observe a relevant value of the adhesion rate. As for the role of
the α parameter, that is the share of those workers that, having a positive
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incentive to switch from TFR to PF, decide to do so, we observe a weak
effect on the final adhesion rate. In particular, in the absence of frictions
in the adhesion process (e.g. α equal to 1), the adhesion rates would be
boosted up to 13%, which shows that results are rather insensitive to such
a parameter.
values which appear too optimistic given the historical data for Italy.
Similar results emerge in the presence of higher values of the α parameter,
that is the share of those workers that, having a positive incentive to switch
from TFR to PF, decide to do so. In particular, in the absence of frictions
in the adhesion process (e.g. α equal to 1), the adhesion rates would be
boosted up to 13%, which shows that results are rather insensitive to such
a parameter.
Finally, as a mere numerical exercise, we present also the effects of a
change in the fiscal treatment of both returns and accrued value of contri-
butions to the PF scheme (recall that the current values of the tax rates
are 11% and 9% respectively). According to our simulations (see Figure
6) it emerges that, in order to boost adhesions to the PF scheme, the most
effective measure would be a reduction in the tax rate burdening the returns
from PF: in fact, even increasing the tax on the accrued value (in order to
offset at least partly the loss in total tax revenues), such a measure would
deliver significantly higher rates of adhesion to the pension funds.
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Figure 6: Adeshion rates for different levels of taxation
A possible reason for this outcome is that, although particularly favourable
relative to the TFR scheme, the fiscal treatment of the PF accrued capital
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will display its full effects only upon retirement, which can be very far in
the future in workers’ life and thus can be hardly perceived as relevant in
the choice of subscribing a pension plan, especially by young workers; on
the contrary the reduction of the tax rate on the PF returns affects current
flows of individuals’ wealth accruals, thus making more attractive the ad-
hesion to a pension fund. However, one has to keep in mind that such a
policy (i.e. reduction of the interest rate tax and increase of the accrued
capital tax) can be rather costly for the State, given that the increase of the
latter tax rate would provide new resources only after several years, that is
when individuals will start to retire or to withdraw from CSS (at least after
7 years, according to the reform). Indeed, such a cost could be partly offset
by the increase in the adhesion rates to PF, given that the returns from
PF and thus tax revenues, ceteris paribus, are higher than those from TFR.
Anyway, the analysis of the exact cost for the State of such a policy change
is beyond the scope of the present paper and is left for future research.
5 Conclusions
In this work we build a model representig the decision process of workers
when choosing between different pension schemes and we use it to provide a
possible explanation of the results of the Italian 2007 reform of complemen-
tary social security for private sector employees. In particular, in our model
each worker when deciding whether to permanently adhere to CSS not only
has to trade off the direct economic advantages and disadvantages (consist-
ing in higher but riskier returns), but also has to take into account the effects
of this individual decision on the financial health of the firm in which he/she
is employed. In fact, the more workers switch to the PF scheme, the more
they indirectly induce the risk of default of the firm in which they work
in, since they erode a (cheap) source of internal financing in the presence
of imperfect financial markets. However, the higher the number of workers
employed in a firm, the lower will be the effect of the individual decision to
switch to a pension fund on the financial health of the firm.
In view of this setting, the adoption of the PF scheme exposes workers
to a twofold risk: the risk on the returns from the PF scheme and the
(increased) risk of default of the firm in which they work in, which, in turn,
would cause a reduction in private welfare, since workers are bound to spend
some time in the unemployment state in the case of a default.
Clearly, the final decision on which scheme to adopt must trade off re-
turns and risks and both the individuals’ and aggregate outcomes will de-
pend on three factors: (a) financial incentives provided by PF (b) firms’
technological and financial conditions and (c) personal attitudes toward risk.
We worked out this framework both theoretically and through simula-
tions. On the theoretical side we investigated the problem by means of a
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representative agent model assuming, for the sake of analytical tractability,
identical individuals and firms. The main conclusions are that workers in-
centives to switch to PF depend positively on the expected returns of the
PF, on the size of the firms and negatively to risk aversion. The financial
structure of firm and the share of workers that already is also relevant in
determining the incentive, with the latter suggesting the presence of a sort
of net externality. However the exact sign of these effects is ambiguous apart
some specific cases. Given the representative agent nature of the model, we
also conclude that (unless there is some friction in the process of switching
to PF) either all workers switch or no workers switch at all and the share of
adhesions stays constant at the starting level.
Through simulations we examined the aggregate outcomes stemming
from individual decisions, taking explicitly into account the heterogeneity
of firms’ and agents’ characteristics and allowing also for more general as-
sumptions on the distribution of productivity shocks. Under some simpli-
fying assumptions on agents’ expectations formation process we found that
(i) given the strongly nonlinear structure of the decision problem and the
interdependencies of the individual decisions with aggregate outcomes, the
long run equilibria are not binary (either all workers stick to their current
scheme or all adhere to PF), but we observe mixed situations in which part
of the population switches to the PF while the other remain at the TFR
scheme and (ii) there is a positive significant relation between the rate of
subscription to the PF scheme and the size of the firm in which agents are
employed, thus confirming the empirical evidence whereby we observe higher
subscription rates in firms of larger size. The sensitivity analysis shows that
adhesion rates are particularly sensitive to unemployment benefits, to re-
turns from the PF and to productivity shocks. A more efficient distribution
of the information about the PF scheme (financial literacy and information
campaigns) seems to increase the speed of adoption but its effect on the
long run rates of adhesion is scarce. Moreover, more optimistic scenarios
on the returns from PF do not seem to overthrow the results, so that the
expected adhesion rates in the regime phase of the reform will fail to reach
high values. Finally, fiscal incentives have a relevant role on the adhesion
rates, and in particular reductions of the tax rate on the interests are more
effective than reductions in the tax rate on the final capital in increasing the
long run adhesion rates.
Summing up, our results seem to grasp some basic features of the Italian
experience, possibly shedding some light on the rationale and mechanisms
behind it. In particular, the lack of efficacy of the reform may be due
to: (a) the peculiarity of the Italian production system, populated by a
large number of small and medium enterprises (SME), which have a fragile
financial structure; (b) the institutional characteristics of the Italian labour
market and the workers’ preferences, opportunities and information sets.
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A Data and Statistics
Tables is this section are taken from Covip (2008) and refers to the end of
the years 2006 and 2007, unless otherwise specified.
Tab. A.1. Gross Replacement rates between public pension and last wage for private sector 
employees and self-employed. Italian defined contribution scheme at the regime phase ( %). 
 Before 
reforms 
After reforms (regime phase) 
 35-40 years 
of 
contribution 
Case 1: 35-40 years of 
contribution 
Case 2: 35-40 years of 
contribution 
Employees Employees 
Self-employed 
(or 
parasubordinati) 
Employees 
Self-employed 
(or 
parasubordinati) 
60   58.46-66.82 35.43-40.49  54.18-61.47 32.83-37.25 
62 70-80  62.23-71.11 37.71-43.09  57.76-65.53 35.00-39.71 
65   69.85-79.83 42.33-48.38  64.86-73.59 39.30-44.6 
Estimates obtained by using mortality tables of ISTAT 2004. Case 1: GDP rate of growth=1.5%, individual 
wages rate of growth=1.5%. Case 2: GDP rate of growth =1.3%, Individual wages rate of growth=1.6%. 
Contribution rates: 33% for employees and  20% for self-employed and “parasubordinati”. 
Tab. A.2. PF in some OECD countries.(1) (2)Value of assets as a percentage of GDP. 
Paesi   2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Australia  56.4 54.2 76.4 85.1 94.3
Austria  3.8 4.1 4.4 4.8 4.8
Belgium  4.9 3.9 4.0 4.5 4.3
Canada  48.5 47.3 48.1 50.3 53.4
Czech Republic   2.7 3.1 3.6 4.2 4.6
Denmark  26.0 28.5 30.9 33.6 32.4
Finland  49.2 53.9 61.8 68.7 71.3
France   .. 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.1
Germany  3.5 3.6 3.8 4.0 4.2
Hungary  4.5 5.2 6.8 8.4 9.7
Iceland  84.3 98.5 106.9 120.1 132.7
Ireland  34.5 39.9 42.2 48.3 49.9
Italy  2.3 2.4 2.6 2.8 3.0
Japan  17.1 19.7 19.4 23.0 23.4
Korea  1.5 1.6 1.7 1.9 2.9
Mexico  5.2 5.8 6.3 9.9 11.5
Netherlands  85.5 101.2 108.4 122.5 130.0
New Zealand  13.0 11.3 11.3 11.3 12.4
Norway  5.5 6.5 6.6 6.7 6.8
Poland  3.8 5.3 6.8 8.7 11.1
Portugal   11.5 11.8 10.5 12.7 13.6
Slovak Republic  0.0 0.0 .. 0.6 2.8
Spain  5.7 6.2 6.6 7.2 7.6
Sweden  7.6 7.7 7.6 9.3 9.5
Switzerland  96.7 103.6 108.2 119.1 122.1
Turkey  .. .. 0.5 0.9 1.0
United Kingdom  59.2 64.8 68.1 79.1 77.1
United States  63.3 72.6 73.8 72.4 73.7
Source: OCSE. Pension Markets in Focus. several years. 
(1) Data refers to autonomous PF whose gathered resources will generate only pension payments. Cfr. OECD, Private 
Pensions: OECD Classification and Glossary, 2005.  (2) With respect to previous data from OECD there are some 
revision to the time series of a few countries, due to the change in the classification criteria of PF.
B Proof of Results of Section 2
Through all this section, to save on notation, we set x = w·[1− γ · k · (1− s) · (1 + r)− h]
and x˜ = w · [1− γ · k · (1− s− 1/N) · (1 + r)− h]. We then have λ = Ψ(x)
and λ˜ = Ψ(x˜).
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B.1 Proof of Propostion 1
We know that Ψ(x) is a cumulative distribution function and thus, by defi-
nition, an increasing function of its argument (i.e. Ψ′ (x) ≡ ∂Ψ(x) /∂x > 0).
Also φ = λ˜− λ = Ψ(x˜)−Ψ(x).
Point 1 We can easily compute
∂x
∂s
= w · γ · k · (1 + r) > 0 (B1)
and since Ψ′ (x) > 0
∂λ
∂s
=
∂Ψ(x)
∂x
·
∂x
∂s
> 0. (B2)
Point 2 We can compute:
∂x˜
∂N
= −w · γ · k · (1 + r) ·
1
N2
6 0 (B3)
and
∂x
∂N
= 0 (B3a)
which, combined with Ψ′(.) > 0 necessarily imply ∂λ˜/∂N < 0 and ∂λ/∂N =
0 . Then
∂φ
∂N
=
∂λ˜
∂N
−
∂λ
∂N
=
∂λ˜
∂N
< 0. (B4)
Point 3 By definition φ = Ψ(x˜)−Ψ(x). Then:
lim
N→∞
φ = Ψ
(
lim
N→∞
x˜
)
−Ψ
(
lim
N→∞
x
)
= 0. (B5)
Point 4 If the density function of the shock is not increasing to the left of
the mean we get Ψ′(.) > 0 and Ψ′′(.) 6 0. This said, since x˜ > x we have
that an increase in s necessarily induces an increase in λ˜ that is not larger
then the increase in λ; then
∂φ
∂s
=
∂λ˜
∂s
−
∂λ
∂s
≤ 0. (B6)
B.2 Proof of Propostion 2
Point 1 By exploiting equation (9):
∂I
∂N
= −
q · (β + λ)
β · (q + λ) · (β + λ+ φ)2
·G ·
∂φ
∂N
(B7)
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and in view of Propostion 1.2, it follows
∂I
∂N
> 0. (B8)
Point 2 From equation (9) we get:
lim
N→∞
I =
G
β · (q + λ)
· q + λ ·B > 0 (B9)
since all involved quantities are positive either by construction or by as-
sumption.
Point 3 Equation (9) can be rewritten as
I =
B · λ+ q ·
(
G− P ·φ
q+λ+φ
)
β · (q + λ)
(B10)
and differentiating I with respect to s we get
∂I
∂s
=
q ·
(
B −G+ P ·φ·(2·(q+λ)+φ)
(q+λ+φ)2
)
· ∂λ
∂s
− P ·q·(q+λ)
2
(q+λ+φ)2
· ∂φ
∂s
β · (q + λ)2
. (B11)
For B ≥ G, since ∂λ
∂s
> 0 and ∂φ
∂s
≤ 0 (as shown in Proposition 1.1 and 1.4),
it follows that:
∂I
∂s
> 0. (B12)
B.3 Proof of Propostion 3
Point 1 We can compute
∂x
∂k
= −w · γ · (1− s) · (1 + r) < 0 (B13)
∂x˜
∂k
= −w · γ · (1− s− 1/N) · (1 + r) < 0 (B13a)
with ∂x˜
∂k
> ∂x
∂k
, and then we can state that
∂λ
∂k
=
∂Ψ(x)
∂x
·
∂x
∂k
< 0. (B14)
∂λ˜
∂k
=
∂Ψ(x˜)
∂x˜
·
∂x˜
∂k
< 0. (B14a)
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If the the density of the shock is not increasing to the left of the mean we
have that Ψ′′(.) ≤ 0 and then, since x˜ > x we have
∂λ
∂k
≤
∂λ˜
∂k
< 0. It follows
that
∂φ
∂k
=
∂λ˜
∂k
−
∂λ
∂k
≥ 0 (B15)
This said, by differentiating (B10) with respect to k we get
∂I
∂k
=
q ·
(
B −G+ P ·φ·(2·(q+λ)+φ)
(q+λ+φ)2
)
· ∂λ
∂k
− P ·q·(q+λ)
2
(q+λ+φ)2
· ∂φ
∂k
β · (q + λ)2
. (B16)
For B > G and considering (B14) and (B15) we then have
∂I
∂k
≤ 0. (B17)
Point 1 We can compute
∂x
∂h
= −w < 0 (B18)
∂x˜
∂h
= −w < 0 (B18a)
and then we can state that
∂λ
∂h
=
∂Ψ(x)
∂x
·
∂x
∂h
< 0 (B19)
∂λ˜
∂h
=
∂Ψ(x˜)
∂x˜
·
∂x˜
∂h
< 0. (B19a)
If the the density of the shock is not increasing to the left of the mean we
have that Ψ′′(.) ≤ 0 and, since x˜ > x, we have ∂λ
∂h
≤ ∂λ˜
∂h
< 0. It follows that
∂φ
∂h
=
∂λ˜
∂h
−
∂λ
∂h
≥ 0. (B20)
Moreover, by differentiating (B10) with respect to h we obtain:
∂I
∂h
=
q ·
(
B −G+ P ·φ·(2·(q+λ)+φ)
(q+λ+φ)2
)
· ∂λ
∂h
− P ·q·(q+λ)
2
(q+λ+φ)2
· ∂φ
∂h
β · (q + λ)2
. (B21)
For B > G and considering (B19) and (B20) it turns out that
∂I
∂h
≤ 0. (B22)
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B.3.1 Proofs of results in Footnote 9
Let VE(T ) the utility of never switching to F , V
0
E(TF−→) the utility of imme-
diately switching and V TE (TF−→) the utility of switching at the T th possible
occasion.
We want to prove that V 0E(TF−→) > VE(T ) ⇔ V
T
E (TF−→) > V
T+k
E (TF−→) ∀
T, ∀ k. We start showing that V 0E(TF−→) > VE(T ) ⇔ V
T
E (TF−→) > V
T+1
E (TF−→).
Consider the choice of switching at the T eth possible occasion and the re-
lated V TE (TF−→). An individual does not know exactly after how many periods
the T eth occasion occurs, however we can call pi the probability that the
T eth occasion occurs after i periods (obviously pi = 0 for i < T ). The value
of V TE (TF−→) is then given by the sum of the expected utility in the case in
which the occasion (and thus the switching) occurs after exactly i periods,
multiplied for the probability of that occurrence: we can then write
V TE (TF−→) =
+∞∑
i=0
piV
T,i
E (TF−→) (B23)
where V T,iE (TF−→) is the utility an individual gets if the T eth occasion occurs
after exactly i periods. The utility V T,iE (TF−→) is made of 2 parts: the utility
the individual gets until he/she switches plus the utility he/she gets after
the switch. If we call Mi the former, we have:
V T,iE (TF−→) =Mi +
V 0E(TF−→)
(1 + β)i
(B24)
and then we have
V TE (TF−→) =
+∞∑
i=0
piMi +
+∞∑
i=0
piV
0
E(TF−→)
(1 + β)i
. (B25)
Note that we do not need to exactly specify neither pi nor Mi: for the rest
of the demonstration this is not necessary.
Analogously, we can write
V T+1E (TF−→) =
+∞∑
i=0
piMi +
+∞∑
i=0
piV
1
E(TF−→)
(1 + β)i
(B26)
where V 1E,TF is the expected utility from postponing the switching until the
following possible occasion.
Combining the two we have
V TE (TF−→) >V
T+1
E (TF−→)⇔ (B27)
+∞∑
i=0
piMi +
+∞∑
i=0
piV
0
E(TF−→)
(1 + β)i
>
+∞∑
i=0
piMi +
+∞∑
i=0
piV
1
E(TF−→)
(1 + β)i
⇔
V 0E(TF−→) >V
1
E(TF−→)
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We can reformulate V 1E,TF as
V 1E(TF−→) =
u (w, r) + (1− λ)V 0E(TF−→) + λV
1
U (TF−→)
1 + β
(B28)
where V 1U (TF−→) is the expected utility of a worker currently unemployed but
that will switch to F as soon as he gets a job, that is:
V 1U (TF−→) =
Eu (bw, ρ) + δV 0E(TF−→) + (1− δ)V
1
U (TF−→)
1 + β
(B29)
which can be rearranged
V 1U (TF−→) =
Eu (bw, ρ) + δV 0E(TF−→)
(β + δ)
. (B29a)
Inserting (B29a) in (B28), we have
V 1E(TF−→) =
u (w, r)
1 + β
+
(1− λ)V 0E(TF−→) + λ
u (bw, r) + δV 0E(TF−→)
(β + δ)
1 + β
. (B31)
We can now determine the condition that guarantees V TE (TF−→) > V
T+1
E (TF−→),
from (B27) we can write
V TE (TF−→) >V
T+1
E (TF−→)⇔ (B32)
V 0E(TF−→) >
u (w, r)
1 + β
+
(1− λ)V 0E(TF−→) + λ
u (bw, r) + δV 0E(TF−→)
(β + δ)
1 + β
= V 1E(TF−→)
where the right part can be arranged as
V 0E(TF−→) >
(β + δ)u (w, r) + λu (bw, r)
λ+ β + δ
= VE(T ). (B33)
Then, combining (B32) and (B33) we can state that
V 0E,TF > VE(T )⇔ V
T
E (TF−→) > V
T+1
E (TF−→) ∀T. (B34)
In addition it is easy to see that V TE (TF−→) > V
T+1
E (TF−→) ∀T ⇔ V
T
E (TF−→) >
V T+kE (TF−→) ∀T, ∀k so that condition (k) necessarily implies:
V 0E,TF > VE(T )⇔ V
T
E,TF > V
T+k
E,TF ∀T, ∀k. (B35)
Condition (h) implies that whenever V 0E,TF > VE(T ) we must have V
T−N
E,TF >
... > V T−1E,TF > V
T
E,TF so that V
0
E,TF > VE(T )⇒ V
0
E,TF > V
T
E,TF .
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C Determination of the pension annuities
We determine here the pension annuities py, with y = T, F , that a worker
is entitled to depending on the pension scheme he chose.
In the case of TFR, we define the accrued value of contributions AVT :
AVT = wγT
S−1∑
t=0
(1 + r)S−1−t (C1)
where S is the number of years of contributions (35 years in the benchmark
simulation), γT = 6.91% and r is the real rate of return of the T scheme.
For the PF case, the rate of return is stochastic variable with distribution
N(ρ¯, σ) and for a possible history of the returns rate ρ˜ = {ρ0, ..., ρS} the
accrued value of contributions is
AVF (ρ˜) = wγF
S−1∑
t=0
(1− cF ) (1 + ρ˜t)
S−1−t (C1a)
where γF = 6.91% + γw + γe, that is the sum of the mandatory rate
(6.91%) and the voluntary share by the worker –γw- and by the employer
– γe; such values were set equal to the Italian average levels provided by
COVIP (2008): 1.16% and 1.22% respectively; cF is the administrative cost
of F , set equal to 0.44% per year, according to the estimates provided by
COVIP (2008). By sampling a huge number of such histories (1000000 in
our case) we numerically determine the distrubition of AVF , functional on
the distribution N(ρ¯, σ) of returns, call it ̥ (AVF p N(ρ¯, σ)).
Second, we compute the accrued value of the (gross of tax) annuity (py)
the individual obtains by selling on the market, in each period, the accrued
value of his/her contributions AV Py:
AV Py = py
S−1∑
t=0
(1 + ι)S−1−t (C2)
where ι is the real interest rate in the financial market.
By imposing the equality AVy = AV Py and solving for py we get the
expression for the annuity. Finally, we compute the net of tax annuity:
py = pyqy
(
1− τ cy
)
+ py (1− qy)
(
1− τ i
)
(C3)
where qy and 1 − qy are the shares of contributions and of interests the
accrued capital and τ cy and τ
i are the tax rates on these components, re-
spectively. The τ cy is set to 23% for T both in the pre and post reform period
and, for F , at 23% in the pre-reform and at 9% in the post-reform; the τ i is
fixed to 11% in all cases. Clearly, since AVF is a random variable with the
numerical distribution ̥ (AVF p N(ρ¯, σ)) we consequentally the distribution
function for pF and pF , with the latter being the distribution of the random
annuities that a worker gets when adhering at the F .
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